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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
eavesdropping of wiretaps, the essential wrong is the same. Even though
wiretapping is not condemned by the letter of the Constitution it seems that
it should be construed to fall within the prohibition of its spirit. As Mr.
Justice Douglas has said, "Unless and until Schwartz is overruled, the
beneficient effect of § 60542 will be stultified by the admission of tainted
evidence in state trials. The privacy of the individual, history assures us,
can never be protected where its violation by state officers meets with
reward rather than punishment." 43
John B. Lieberman, III
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-TEST FOR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
United States v. Currens (3d Cir. 1961).
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania for a violation of the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act.' On appeal, defendant urged the adoption of the
Durham test2 of criminal responsibility. The Court of Appeals decided
that a charge on the issue of criminal responsibility in terms of the
McNaghten rule and the irresistible impulse test was prejudicial error, and
held that defendant was entitled to a new trial with the criminal responsi-
bility issue to be determined by the following test: whether the jury was
satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act, defendant, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have
violated. United States v. Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
At present the most widely used test in the United States for criminal
responsibility is still the McNaghten rule.3 This is the famous "right-
wrong" test which, although criticized since its adoption, has withstood
the onslaughts of. psychiatrist 4 and lawyer 5 alike. The nineteenth century
42. See note 33 supra.
43. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458, 81 S. Ct. 650, 653 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958).
2. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "The
rule . . . is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of a mental disease or mental defect."
3. McNaghten's case, 10 Clark and Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1848). The
defendant must be "labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he
did know it, he did not know what he was doing was wrong."
4. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. Rlv 325
(1955); Roche, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Disease: Medical Aspects, 26
TxNN. L. Rev. 222 (1959).
5. BIGGs, Ti GuiLTY MIND (1955); Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal
Law: From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
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psychiatric theories of a "compartmentalized" mind (separate compart-
ments for the intellect, will and emotions) were not adequately embodied
in the McNaghten rule, since it determined criminal insanity solely on
the basis of impairment of the intellect, and neglected the will and emotions.
An attempt to solve this insufficiency resulted in the suggestion of an
"irresistible impulse" test.7 But the word "impulse" has connotations of
a sudden emotional reaction, and so was criticized as not taking into
account those mental disorders characterized by brooding and reflection.
The nineteenth century "compartment" theory has now generally been
replaced by an "integration" theory,8 which asserts that the whole human
personality is interrelated and that any disease or defect of one part
affects the entire person. The New Hampshire Supreme Court as early as
1869 rejected the McNaghten rule and substituted what it felt was a
test9 encompassing the "integration" theory and bringing the legal con-
cept of insanity abreast of contemporary psychiatric principles, yet leaving
the criminal responsibility issue to the jury. However, this decision had
little effect on the criminal law in the United States until the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1954 adopted the
now famous "Durham," or "disease-product" rule' 0 which that court said
was "not unlike" that adopted by New Hampshire in 1869. According to
Durham, if defendant's alleged criminal act was the product of his mental
disease, he is not criminally responsible. The decision provoked a vast
amount of comment both favorable and unfavorable." The favorable com-
ment stemmed from those who were anxious to see the McNaghten rule
completely abolished and supplanted by a test which brings medical and
legal concepts of insanity closer to a synthesis.' 2 The unfavorable comment
criticized the vagueness of Durham and what was claimed to be a lack
of reality in denoting the mental disorder as the cause of the crime.'3
6. Glueck, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 14 VA. L. Rev. 155 (1928);
Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond,
41 A.B.A.J. 793, 794 (1955).
7. According to the irresistible impulse test, the defendant is not guilty by
reason of insanity, even if he knows his act was wrong, if "he is yet by an insane
impulse . . . irresistibly driven to commit it." State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, 82, 83
(1868).
8. Op. cit. supra note 6.
9. ". . . whether there is such a mental disease as dipsomania, and whether
defendant had that disease, and whether the killing of Brown was the product of
such disease, were questions of fact for the jury." State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 407(1869).
10. Durham v. United States, supra note 2.
11. Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychi-
atrists, 41 IowA L. Rgv. 485 (1956); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness, 22 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 325 (1955); Zilboorg, A Step toward Enlightened
Justice, 22 U. CHi. L. Rgv. 331 (1955). But see Hall, In Defense of the McNaghten
Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956); Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22
U. Cm. L. Rzv. 336 (1955). "This Court has no desire to join the courts of New
Hampshire and the District of Columbia in their 'magnificent isolation' of rebellion
against McNaghten . . ." Andersen v. United States, 237 F. 2d 118, 127 (9th Cir.
1957).
12. Zilboorg, A Step toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cmx. L. RZv. 331 (1955).
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Since 1954, the District of Columbia court has attempted to clarify its
rule,' 4 especially by further elucidation of the causation principle. That
court has stated that, "The short phrases 'product of' and 'causal con-
nection' are not intended to be precise . . . they mean that the facts
concerning the disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to
justify reasonably the conclusion that 'but for this disease the act would
not have been committed."'15 Like the New Hampshire rule, Durham
has been largely shunned by other jurisdictions,' though Maine has
recently adopted the rule by statute.'1 Now the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has replaced the McNaghten and irre-
sistible impulse tests with its new rule in a lengthy, explanatory opinion.
To legally punish an accused, it must be shown that he committed
the guilty act (actus reus) with the requisite guilty mind (mens rea).18
For the mens rea requirement to be satisfied, the defendant must have
known that the act was wrong and nevertheless freely have chosen to
do it.19 It would violate this basic principle of Anglo-American law to
hold a person criminally responsible for acts the occurrence of which he
was not free to prevent. Although the concept of free will is philosophically
controversial, the criminal law must operate on the basic premise that it
does exist,2 0 that man has the ability to determine his actions and that
they are not determined for him. So the law-breaker is not legally
responsible who does not know that his act is wrong or could not freely
choose to conform his act to the requirements of law. Mental disorder
may, if sufficiently severe, negate the mens rea requirement to such an
extent that the law, recognizing the lack of capacity, will excuse guilt.
Certainly not every mental abnormality (for example, mild neurosis)
should relieve one of criminal responsibility. However, a moral judgment,
based on contemporary ethical and scientific standards and stated in legal
terms as to "how much" or "what degree" of mental abnormality will
excuse guilt, is necessary. The Third Circuit's moral judgment is ex-
pressed in the instant case. This judgment emphasizes and focuses the
court's attention on the criminal responsibility issue - whether the
defendant had substantial capacity to conform his act to law 2' (thus to
14. See especially, Carter v. United States, 252 F. 2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Douglas v. United States, 239 F. 2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
15. Carter v. United States, 252 F. 2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
16. Black v. United States, 269 F. 2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959); State v. Crose, 88
Ariz. 389, 357 P. 2d 136 (1960) ; State v. Taborsky, 147 Conn. 194, 158 A. 2d 239
(1960) ; People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill. 2d 60, 142 N.E. 2d 11 (1957) ; Commonwealth
v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E. 2d 914 (1958); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,
401 Pa. 242, 164 A. 2d 98 (1960) ; State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A. 2d 623 (1957).
See also, Note, 5 VILL. L. Rav. 138 (1959).
17. Ms. Rev. STAT. ANN., Ch. 149, §§ 38-A, 38-B (1961).
18. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 725 (1957).
19. Id. at 653.
20. See Judge Burger's concurring opinion in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.
2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
21. The Currens Rule is thus a modification of the American Law Institute's
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, "Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
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satisfy the mens rea) - rather than the mental disorder of the defendant,
which the Durham rule 22 emphasizes. Durham also limits the jury's
evaluation of the issue of choice by using the word product, thus attempting
to formulate the elusive concept of causal relationship between the alleged
act and a mental disease or defect. In a sense, every act of a mentally
diseased person is a product of his disease in some degree. To allow so
fluid a concept to be the jury's standard of criminal responsibility might
allow some criminals, who could conform their conduct to law, to be classed
as insane because their act was in some way a product of their disease.
On the other hand, the instant opinion recognizes the pressing problem of
recidivism in the criminal law. Under the McNaghten rule, those with
impaired wills were not considered insane, and so received prison sen-
tences and were returned to society uncured, ready to commit more serious
crimes. The present opinion suggests that anyone lacking substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to law should be institutionalized in-
definitely until he could be safely returned to society.28 Lest it be misun-
derstood, it should be pointed out that the Currens rule does not turn a
field of law over to psychiatrists, but rather seeks the aid of psychiatry to
solve a perplexing legal problem. According to the opinion, expert psy-
chiatric testimony should stress the entire personality of the accused, and
questioning should be designed to expand rather than narrow such testi-
mony. "The defendants entire relevant symptomatology must be brought
before the court and fully explained." 4 This testimony should be as limited
in technical psychiatric jargon as possible, while emphasizing the compul-
sions which direct the mentally disordered mind on a path strange to
reality. The most difficult practical problem with any criminal responsi-
bility test is bridging the gap between the expert psychiatric testimony,
stated in medical terms, and the legal test, stated in legal terms, in a way
that can be meaningful to a lay jury. A point not sufficiently covered
by the opinion is the problem of just how to explain the terms "mental
disease or defect" to the jury.25 Should the jury merely be referred to the
testimony on disease and defect, or should an accepted legal definition of
the terms be developed? Although the new rule seems to be almost too
simply stated, it could be very effective if properly developed by the
court in later decisions, and accepted as a long overdue improvement
by an open-minded legal system. It is stated in terms that the attorney,
judge and juror can understand, and establishes a flexible legal standard
by which the jury can decide the ultimate issue of criminal responsibility.
Michael R. Bradley
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). (Emphasis added).
22. Durham v. United States, (s'pra note 2.
23. United States v. Currens, 290 F. 2d 751, 767.
24. Id. at 772.
25. For a criticism of Durham on the same point, see Judge Burger's concurring
opinion in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 865 (1961).
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